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COMMENTS
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME-THE TEXAS
APPROACH
by Paul M Koning
During the 1979 session, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 21,'
the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the Act),2 placing Texas in the fore-
front of the rapidly growing trend to provide state administered programs
for the financial compensation of individuals injured by violent crimes.
Increased crime rates and welfare costs have focused concern on victims'
rights.3 In response, the Act establishes a compensation program that has
the potential to equal or exceed the effectiveness of programs existing in
other states.
Victim compensation is not a novel concept; the theory of state compen-
sation to victims of crimes occurring within the state can be traced back at
least 4,300 years to the Code of Hammurabi.4 In modern times, however,
the crime victim has been afforded relatively little aid. Apart from recov-
ery under one of the recently formed state victim compensation programs,
the victim is limited to three basic alternatives to the absorption of the
loss.5 The first alternative is a civil action brought against the offender.
Since civil recovery requires both the apprehension of the criminal and his
financial solvency, this device has been accurately described as impotent. 6
A victim may also recover his crime-related losses from his insurer, pro-
1. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 189, §§ 1-19, at 402-10 (Vernon).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 1-18 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
3. A study of the diffusion pattern of state victim compensation programs has shown
that the states most likely to enact victim compensation programs are those that experience
the greatest increases in per capita welfare expenditures, violent crime rates, and median
family income. Doerner, The Diffusion of Victim Compensation Laws in the United States, 4
VICTIMOLOGY 119 (1979).
4. Sections 22-24 of the Code of Hammurabi state:
[§ 22] If a man has committed robbery and is caught, that man shall be put to
death.
[§ 23] If the robber is not caught, the man who has been robbed shall formally
declare whatever he has lost before a god, and the city and the mayor in whose
territory or district the robbery has been committed shall compensate him for
whatever he has lost.
[§ 24] If (it is) the life (of the owner that is lost), the city or the mayor shall pay
one mana of silver to his kinsfolk.
2 THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 21 (G. Driver & J. Miles eds. 1955). For a comprehensive treat-
ment of victim compensation and victim's rights throughout history, see S. SCHAFER, VIC-
TIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM AND His CRIMINAL 5-32 (1977).
5. See Lamborn, Remedies/or the Victims of Crime, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 22 (1970);
McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in America, 8 URB. LAW. 346
(1976).
6. McAdam, supra note 5, at 348.
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vided that he has adequate coverage. 7 The most frequent victims of crime,
however, are those who can least afford insurance, both because they are
poor and because they live within the highest premium areas.8 For this
reason, insurance is hardly a choice for the average victim. The third al-
ternative is restitution. Restitution programs allow criminal justice agen-
cies to establish direct obligatory relationships between the offender and
his victim, often as a condition of sentence modification.9 Typically, a
state restitution program encourages courts to condition probation on the
repayment of the victim's losses by the performance of services or by cash
payments.' 0 Restitution forces the criminal to confront the problems
caused by his actions; theoretically, this confrontation is rehabilitative. I I
Pragmatically, however, restitution is no more an alternative to the victim
than a civil suit, because the majority of criminals are never convicted. 12
Victim compensation programs, on the other hand, offer hope to the victim
because they are not linked to the apprehension of the criminal. Instead,
these programs are generally based on one or more theories of state obliga-
tion 13 and are funded either from the general revenues or, as in Texas,
from a pool of small fines collected from criminals upon conviction.14
New Zealand established the first modern victim compensation program
in 1963,15 immediately followed by Great Britain. 16 California initiated
7. For an analysis of the crime exclusions in certain policies, see Starrs, .4 Modest Pro-
posal to Insure Justice for Victims of Crime, 50 MINN. L. REV. 285, 301-05 (1965).
8. Haas, An Argumentfor the Enactment of Criminal Victim Compensation Legislation in
Oregon, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 185, 196 (1974); McAdam, supra note 5, at 348.
9. See generally Laster, Criminal Restitution: 4 Survey of its Past History and an Analy-
sis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 80 (1970); Schafer, Restitution to Victims of
Crime-An Old CorrectionalAim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1965).
10. See Cohen, The Integration ofRestitution in the Probation Services, in CONSIDERING
THE VICTIM 332-33 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1975). TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42.12, § 6(m) (Vernon Supp. 1980) authorizes a court to order that, as a condition of proba-
tion, the offender "pay a percentage of his income to the victim of the offense, if any, to
compensate the victim for any property damage or medical expenses sustained by the victim
as a direct result of the commission of the offense."
11. Schafer, The Proper Role of a Victim-Compensation System, 21 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 45 (1975).
12. The United States Department of Justice has reported that for every 100 offenses
known to police, only 5.5 persons are apprehended and found guilty as charged. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1977, at 512 (1978) [herein-
after cited as SOURCEBOOK]. "The President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence reported that only 1.8 percent of victims of crime ever collect damages from the
perpetrator." 2 BROWN & DANA, STATE LEGISLATURES 7 (1976), cited in Gross, Crime Vic-
tim Compensation in North Dakota.4 Year of Trial and Error, 53 N.D.L. REV. 7, 7 n. I
(1976).
13. For a discussion of the theoretical justifications underlying state victim compensa-
tion legislation, see notes 63-80 infra and accompanying text.
14. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 14 (Vernon Supp. 1980) establishes a
fund for the payment of compensation under the Act, which is to be made up of $10 and $15
court costs exacted from convicted felons and certain misdemeanants. See note 59 infra.
15. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, STAT. N.Z. No. 134 (1963), reprinted in 43 S.
CAL. L. REV. 240 (1970); see Weeks, The New Zealand Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 107 (1970).
16. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, CMND. No. 2323 (1964),




the first program in the United States in 1965.17 By the mid-seventies a
definite trend had been established toward state victim compensation pro-
grams, a trend partially attributable to a series of federal bills aimed at
subsidizing state programs.18 At the present time, twenty-nine states have
some form of victim compensation program. 19
This Comment explores the significant provisions of the Texas Act and
analyzes in greater depth two controversial restrictions: the financial stress
requirement and the household exclusion. Finally, this Comment stresses
the need for effective implementation of the Act's publicity provisions and
discusses the intriguing "Son of Sam" sections in light of the constitutional
problems that they present.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13974 (West Supp. 1980).
18. Since the mid-sixties, a number of bills aimed at providing federal compensation to
victims of violent crimes have been introduced before Congress, but as yet none has passed
both houses. The earlier bills were intended to establish a federally financed national crime
victim compensation program. S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 11818, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). Since 1972, however, the most significant federal crime victim compensa-
tion bills have taken a two-pronged approach; these bills would provide for 100% compensa-
tion to victims of crimes subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and a partial subsidization
of state programs that qualify. E.g., S. 2994, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For a detailed
history of the federal legislative attempts, see H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, PUBLIC COMPEN-
SATION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 191-209 (1974).
One of the bills currently before the Judiciary Committee, H.R. 957, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), shows promise because it is a result of a conference committee compromise of the
1977 bill, H.R. 7010, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). If passed, H.R. 957 would authorize fed-
eral subsidization of 25% of the current cost of state programs that qualify. The Texas Act,
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 1-18 (Vernon Supp. 1980), meets all the criteria
of H.R. 957, which include a right to judicial or administrative review, a requirement for
cooperation with local law enforcement agencies, and state rights of subrogation. Several
similar bills are before the Judiciary Committee. See S. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 4257, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1961, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1899,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 99, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). It is probable that the
pendency of federal legislation not only encourages states to adopt victim compensation
programs, but influences the nature of state programs by establishing minimum criteria for
subsidization.
19. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.180 (1974 & Supp. 1979); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-
13974 (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-201 to -215 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 9001-9017 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 960.01-.25 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 47-518 to -526 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1976 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, §§ 71-84 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-3.6-1 to -17
(Burns Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7301 to -7318 (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 346.010-.180 (1977 & Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (1973 & Supp.
1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1968 & Supp. 1980); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 18.351-.368 (West Supp. 1967-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 299B.01-
.17 (West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 53-9-101 to -133 (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 217.010-.270 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-I to -21 (West Supp. 1979-1980);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-
13-01 to -20 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.51-.72 (Page Supp. 1979); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 147.005-.365 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 180-7 to -7.16 (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25-1 to -14 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-35-101
to -117 (Supp. 1979); TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 1-18 (Vernon Supp. 1980);
VA. CODE §§ 19.2-368.1 to .18 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.010-.910
(Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.01-.18 (West Supp. 1979-1980). The Rhode Island
statute does not become active until the enactment of federal crime victim legislation. The
Nevada and Georgia statutes are limited to "good Samaritan" victims, those who are injured
in an attempt to stop an ongoing crime or while aiding police officers.
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I. THE TEXAS CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT
The Act is a hybrid of provisions culled from various existing statutes as
well as from the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act.20 The purpose
of the program,2' like that of almost every compensation program in exist-
ence, is to compensate victims of violent crimes for the pecuniary losses 22
incurred as a result of their physical injuries. Neither property loss 23 nor
pain and suffering24 are compensable under the Act. Furthermore, a
20. This Act has been adopted in North Dakota and Ohio and represents an effort of
the commissioners on Uniform State Laws to come to grips with the difficult issues involved
in victim compensation legislation.
21. The formal purpose of the Act is declared in § 2:
The legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal injury
or death as a result of criminal acts. Crime victims and persons who intervene
in crimes on behalf of peace officers may suffer disabilities, incur financial
burdens, or become dependent on public assistance. The legislature finds and
determines that there is a need for indemnification of victims of crime and
citizens who suffer personal injury or death in the prevention of crime or the
apprehension of criminals.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
22. The Act includes a typical definition of pecuniary loss, which defines the limits of
financial compensation for each individual:
(7) "Pecuniary loss" means the amount of expense reasonably and necessarily
incurred:
(A) regarding personal injury for:
(i) medical, hospital, nursing, or psychiatric care or counseling, and physical
therapy;
(ii) actual loss of past earnings and anticipated loss of future earnings because
of a disability resulting from the personal injury at a rate not to exceed $150
per week; and
(iii) care of minor children enabling a victim or his or her spouse, but not both
of them, to continue gainful employment at a rate not to exceed $30 per child
per week up to a maximum of $75 per week for any number of children; and
(B) as a consequence of death for:
(i) funeral and burial expenses;
(ii) loss of support to a dependent or dependents not otherwise compensated
for as a pecuniary loss for personal injury, for as long as the dependence
would have existed had the victim survived, at a rate of not more than a total
of $150 per week for all dependents; and
(iii) care of minor children enabling the surviving spouse of a victim to engage
in lawful employment, where that expense is not otherwise compensated for as
a pecuniary loss for personal injury, at a rate not to exceed $30 per week per
child, up to a maximum of $75 per week for any number of children.
(C) Pecuniary loss does not include loss attributable to pain and suffering.
Id. § 3(7).
23. No compensation program in existence today allows recovery for the loss of prop-
erty, although some, such as Tennessee, expressly exclude hearing aids and eyeglasses from
the definition of property. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-35-106(5)(b) (Supp. 1979). The exclusion
of property loss may be justified on three grounds: first, the economic infeasibility of such a
program; secondly, the opportunity for fraud that such a program would present; and
thirdly, "property damage does not destroy a person's only indispensable asset, that is, the
ability to earn a living." Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 444, 460 (1964); see Fry, Justicefor Victims, 8 J. PUB. L. 191, 193 (1959).
24. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(7)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Only one
state, Hawaii, allows compensation for pain and suffering. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-33(4)
(1976). The lack of criteria upon which to base awards is a difficulty faced by the Hawaii
program, and other states have chosen to avoid this problem. Tennessee makes one excep-
tion, and allows recovery for pain and suffering in cases involving rape or sexual deviancy.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-35-106(5)(C) (Supp. 1979).
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number of restrictions and qualifications limit the class of eligible claim-
ants and the recovery available to each. The Act directs the Industrial
Accident Board (the Board), the agency normally in charge of workers'
compensation, to administer the program.25
A. Eligibility
Before an individual can recover under the Act, the Board must be satis-
fied by a preponderance of the evidence 26 that the requirements of the Act
have been met. The threshold requirement is that the individual is a "vic-
tim" within the meaning of the Act. Victims include Texas residents27 who
suffer personal injury28 or death as a result of criminally injurious con-
duct,29 intervenors,30 dependents of deceased victims, 3' and those who, in
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 10 (Vernon Supp. 1980). States have
varied widely in their choice of administrative agencies. Many, such as New York and Con-
necticut, have established a compensation board unaffiliated with any existing agency. The
Massachusetts and Tennessee programs are administered by state courts. Other states have
allowed compensation programs to be subsumed by existing agencies in charge of workers'
compensation (Texas, Washington), or public safety (Alaska). California had originally del-
egated control of its compensation program to the Department of Social Welfare, but trans-
ferred authority to the State Board of Control upon the realization that the compensation
program had taken on the undesirable aura of welfare. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS,
supra note 18, at 82-85.
26. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
27. Id. § 3(9)(A). Not only must the victim be a Texas resident, but the criminally
injurious conduct must have occurred in Texas as well. Id. § 3(4)(A). Other states that limit
recovery to residents include California, Delaware, and Washington. States that do not limit
recovery to residents include Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota.
28. Id. § 3(9)(A). While the definition of "victim" requires personal injury, the Act
requires that the victim suffer physical injury in order to recover. Id. § 6(b). The § 6(b)
requirement of physical injury is the result of a house committee substitute amendment.
Under S.B. 21, 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 189, §§ 1-19, at 402-10 (Vernon), as originally
proposed, pecuniary loss incurred as the result of personal injury was compensable, includ-
ing psychological counseling of rape victims who suffer mental, but not physical, injury. It is
estimated that 25% of all rape victims seek no medical attention. SOURCEBOOK, supra note
12, at 346.
29. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(9)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Id. § 3(4)
defines criminally injurious conduct:
(4) "Criminally injurious conduct" means conduct that:
(A) occurs or is attempted in this state;
(B) poses a substantial threat of personal injury or death;
(C) is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or death, or would be so punish-
able but for the fact that the person engaging in the conduct lacked capacity to
commit the crime under the laws of this state; and
(D) is not conduct arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle, aircraft, or water vehicle except when intended to cause per-
sonal injury or death in violation of Section 38, Uniform Act Regulating Traf-
fic on Highways, as amended (Article 6701d, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes),
or Article 67011-1 or 67011-2, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as
amended.
The words "criminally injurious conduct" are used to avoid giving an artificial meaning to
the word "crime." Not all crimes will give rise to compensation under the Act. See UNI-
FORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT § 1, Comment. Some states, such as Hawaii, in-
stead of using the broad brush approach chosen by Texas, use a list of crimes to describe the
conduct that can lead to compensation. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 351-32 (1976). The Hawaiian
practice risks penalizing innocent victims of crimes omitted by oversight.
30. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(9)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1980) incorpo-
rates a "good Samaritan" statute within the Act. Id. § 3(8) provides:
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the case of a deceased victim, legally or voluntarily assume the medical or
burial expenses of the victim. 32 Once the Board determines that a claim-
ant3 3 is a victim, it must be satisfied that as a result of criminally injurious
conduct, the victim suffered physical injury34 or death, which in turn re-
sulted in pecuniary loss. 35 The Board must be convinced that the victim is
unable to recoup this pecuniary loss without suffering financial stress. 36 In
addition, the victim's recovery may be denied or reduced to the extent that
the victim's pecuniary loss is compensated from collateral sources. 37
Three restrictions -urther narrow the eligible class. f _..t, victims failing
to file applications with the Board within 180 days after the crime, 38 or
victims failing to report the crime to the appropriate local law enforcement
agency within seventy-two hours, 39 must be denied recovery. Secondly,
(8) "Intervenor" means a person who goes to the aid of another and is killed
or injured in the good faith effort to prevent criminally injurious conduct, to
apprehend a person reasonably suspected of having engaged in such conduct,
or to aid a police officer. Intervenor does not include a peace officer, fireman,
lifeguard, or person whose employment includes the duty to protect the public
safety acting within the course and scope of his or her employment.
31. Id. § 3(9)(C). Section 3(5) defines dependent by reference to I.R.C. § 152, with the
addition of surviving spouses and posthumous children of deceased victims.
32. Id. § 3(9)(D).
33. Id. § 3(2) defines claimant as "a victim or an authorized person acting on behalf of
any victim."
34. Id. § 6(b); see note 28 supra.
35. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980); see note
22 supra.
36. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980). For a
discussion of the financial stress requirement, one of the major issues in victim compensa-
tion legislation, see notes 83-109 infra and accompanying text. For the statutory definition
of financial stress, see note 88 infra.
37. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 6(b), 6(d)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980)
both preclude recovery to the extent of compensation from a collateral source, which is
defined in id. § 3(3):
(3) "Collateral source" means a source of benefits or advantages for pecuni-
ary loss awardable other than under this Act which the victim has received, or
which is readily available to him or her from:
(A) the offender under an order of restitution to the claimant imposed by a
court as a condition of probation;
(B) the United States or a federal agency, a state or any of its political sub-
divisions, or an instrumentality of two or more states, unless the law providing
for the benefits or advantages makes them in excess of or secondary to benefits
under this Act;
(C) Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid;
(D) state-required temporary nonoccupational disability insurance;
(E) workers' compensation;
(F) wage continuation programs of any employer;
(G) proceeds of a contract of insurance payable to the victim for loss which
he or she sustained because of the criminally injurious conduct; or
(H) a contract providing prepaid hospital and other health care services, or
benefits for disability.
38. Id. § 6(c)(l). The 180-day period may be extended by the Board "for good cause
shown." Id. § 4(c). States vary as to the time limit for filing a claim. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 18.355(2) (West Supp. 1967-1979), allows the shortest period, 30 days, while ALASKA
STAT. § 18.67.130(a) (1974 & Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-21 l(a) (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 70, § 73 (q) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.08(1) (West
Supp. 1979-1980) allow two years in which to file a claim.
39. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The re-
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recovery will be denied if the victim knowingly and willingly participated
in the criminally injurious conduct.40 Thirdly, if the criminal offender or
his accomplice resided in the same household as the victim, no compensa-
tion may be awarded to the victim. 4' If, after consideration of the forego-
ing restrictions and requirements, the Board considers the victim eligible
for compensation, recovery may still be denied or reduced if the victim has
not "substantially cooperated" with law enforcement authorities,4 2 or if the
victim's behavior at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim was
such that he ort. e bears responsibility for the crirtinal act or omission.4 3
Once the Board approves the victim's application, it may compensate
the victim for his pecuniary loss by means of a lump-sum cash payment or
by a series of payments,44 which awards may not exceed $50,000 in the
aggregate. 45 Alternatively, the Board may refer the claimant to state voca-
quirement for reporting the crime to police is intended to encourage aid and cooperation in
law enforcement efforts. Section 4(b) allows the 72-hour period to be extended if the exten-
sion "is justified by extraordinary circumstances as determined by the board." Most states
have either a 72- or 48-hour requirement, although New Jersey allows three months. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Supp. 1979-1980). Hawaii and Delaware have no police re-
porting requirement.
40. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980). All state
compensation statutes contain a similar provision; it seems natural to prevent the criminal or
his accomplice from benefiting from his crime. The statute denies recovery if the person
whose injury or death gave rise to the application participated in the crime, thus disallowing
recovery to the child or spouse of a slain criminal. Id.
41. Id. § 6(c)(4). For a discussion of the household exclusion, see notes 110-46 infra
and accompanying text.
42. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(d)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Section
5(e)(l) authorizes the Board to request information from prosecuting attorneys and law en-
forcement agencies for the purpose of determining claimant cooperation. One of the antici-
pated benefits of the program is an increase in police cooperation engendered by § 6(d)(l).
See Edelhertz, Geis, Chappell & Sutton, Part ll-Public Compensation of Victims of Crime.-
A Survey of the New York Experience, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 103-05 (1973).
43. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. an. 8309-1, § 6(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The ques-
tion of victim precipitation or responsibility plays a large role not only in victim compensa-
tion legislation, but in the nascent field of victimology. See, e.g., Silverman, Victim
Precoiitation: An Examination of the Concept, in VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus (I. Drapkin
& E. Viano eds. 1974). Most state programs include such a provision, which is understanda-
bly difficult to administer. One of the most common applications of this provision occurs
when the victim is criminally injured a short time after soliciting a prostitute. See COMMIT-
TEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, LEGAL ISSUES IN COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 24-25 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ISSUES]. Other situations in which compensation may possibly be de-
nied include illegal hitchhiking or wearing furs or jewelry in areas well-known for high
crime rates.
44. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 7(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Pecuniary
loss accrued to the date of the award shall be paid in a lump sum, and future expenses are to
be paid in installments unless the Board finds a lump sum payment will promote the interest
of the claimant, or the present value of all future pecuniary loss does not exceed $1,000. Id.
§§ 7(c)-(d).
45. Id. § 7(b). The $50,000 maximum is a limit on the aggregate compensation
awarded to all claimants whose claim arises out of the injury or death of the same victim.
Id. The Act establishes the highest maximum award of all the state programs, except for
Ohio, which also allows $50,000. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E) (Page Supp. 1979).
The lowest of the state limits is $10,000, shared by California, Connecticut, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The
1980]
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tional facilities or provide counseling services. 46 Upon the awarding of
compensation, the state becomes subrogated to all the claimant's rights to
receive or recover benefits from collateral sources to the extent that the
state has awarded compensation. 47 The Act also provides that the Board
shall award reasonable attorneys' fees to attorneys representing successful
claimants. 4
B. Procedure
After a victim submits an application to the Board, a clerk appointed by
the Board reviews the application for completeness. 49 A complete applica-
tion is then reviewed by one Board member who determines whether a
hearing is necessary.50 A hearing on the application must be held if the
Board member deems it necessary or if either the attorney general or the
claimant requests a hearing. 5' The Act gives the Board the special power
to order the victim to submit to a mental or physical examination or to
order an autopsy of a deceased victim "if the mental, physical, or emo-
tional condition of a victim is material to a claim" 52 and if the order is "for
Texas maximum is commendable, for in many instances criminal injuries are permanently
debilitating, and $10,000 is quickly exhausted.
Many states also have a minimum claim amount. These states include Connecticut and
Delaware ($25), Illinois ($200), Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia (all $100). Commentators tend
to view a minimum claim requirement with disfavor. See, e.g., H. EDELHERTZ & G. GElS,
supra note 18, at 47.
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 7(a)(2)-(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). In
addition to providing public counseling services, the Board may contract with private enti-
ties to provide these services. Id.
47. Id. § I I(a). Section 1 (a) is an unfortunately drafted section that is susceptible to
the extreme interpretation that once a claimant has received any award from the Board, the
state becomes subrogated to the total amount of collateral recovery available to the claim-
ant, even if that amount is much greater than the compensation awarded by the Board.
Section I I(a) provides: "If compensation is awarded, the state is subrogated to all the claim-
ant's rights to receive or recover benefits for pecuniary loss to the extent compensation is
awarded from a source which is or if readily available to the claimant would be a collateral
source." Id.
Naturally, the state's right of subrogation should be limited to the amount awarded by the
state to the claimant. The ambiguity of § I I(a) could be simply remedied by an amendment
that moves the phrase "to the extent compensation is awarded" to a position immediately
preceding "the state is subrogated."
48. Id. § 12 provides:
As part of an order, the board shall determine and award reasonable attor-
ney's fees, commensurate with services rendered, to be paid by the state to the
attorney representing the claimant. Additional attorney's fees may be
awarded by a court in the event of review. Attorney's fees may be denied on a
finding that the claim or appeal is frivolous. Awards of attorney's fees shall be
in addition to awards of compensation. It is unlawful for an attorney to con-
tract for or receive any larger sum than the amount allowed. Attorney's fees
may not be paid to an attorney of a claimant unless an award is made to the
claimant.
49. Id. § 5(a).
50. Id. § 5(c).
51. Id. The attorney general shall be sent a copy of every application received by the
Board, and may appear at hearings and present evidence either supporting or opposing ap-
proval of the application. Id. § 5(b).
52. Id. § 5(e)(3). Upon request the Board must give the person examined, or the claim-
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good cause shown." 53
At any time after the denial or award of compensation, the Board may,
on its own motion or at the request of the claimant, reconsider its deci-
sion.54 In addition, a claimant has the right to judicial review of a final
ruling.55 To preserve this right, the claimant must file a "notice of dissatis-
faction" with the Board within twenty days of the ruling and bring suit in
district court within twenty days of the filing of notice.56 The district court
will then determine the issues de novo.57
The costs of awards and administration are to be paid exclusively from
the Compensation to Victims of Crime Fund, established in the state treas-
ury. 58 This fund is solely comprised of additional court costs imposed on
convicted criminals:59 $15 in the case of a felony and $10 in the case of a
ant in the case of a deceased victim, a copy of the physician's or psychologist's report. Id.
§ 5(f).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 9(a).
55. Id. § 9(c). The right to judicial review has been a perennial qualification for federal
subsidization in the series of federal victim compensation bills. See, e.g., H.R. 957, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(2) (1979).
56. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 9(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 14(a).
59. The funding of compensation programs through fining or imposing court costs on
convicted criminals is a relatively recent development. California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Maryland, and Washington also use this method of funding, although program
appropriations are not limited to this source. One commentator has suggested that "[i]t is
. . . an illusion to look to criminal fines, or subrogation, as a substantial source for financing
reparations to crime victims." H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 18, at 290. The Texas
program will test the accuracy of this prediction.
The method of funding may give rise to a constitutional challenge. One problem arises
from the fact that all convicted criminals, except those convicted of misdemeanors with fines
less than $200, must pay the court costs. irrespective of whether their offense was violent or
nonviolent. Arguably, since the court costs are to be used solely for the purpose of compen-
sating victims of violent crime, the statutory classification of those individuals who will pay
the court costs is not reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation and contravenes the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 190-91 (1964).
This equal protection argument was made before the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Champe, No. 53,811 (Fla. Dec. 14, 1978). In Champe, the supreme court overruled the
lower court's finding that the funding provisions of the statute were unconstitutional. Chief
Justice England stated:
Laws which classify violent and non-violent offenders together for purposes
related solely to the prevention of violent crimes have consistently been up-
held against equal protection attacks. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d
418, 423 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). . . . It is not irra-
tional for the legislature similarly to combine all lawbreakers for the purpose
of remedying the consequences of violent crime.
Id., slip op. at 7. Brown, however, dealt with the constitutionality of a law proscribing the
interstate transportation of firearms by convicted felons, regardless of the violent nature of
the felony. The broad brush classification in Brown bears a far more rational relation to the
purpose of the statute than does the Champe classification. The Brown classification can be
viewed as based not only on the criminal offense, but on post-crime experience in prison,
and can be justified by the high rate of crimes committed by ex-convicts. In Champe a
shoplifter was fined to help pay for injuries suffered at the hands of rapists, murderers, and
armed robbers. Unlike Brown, the statutory classification in Champe was not based on a
reasonable attempt to protect the public, nor was it based on any harm directly caused by
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misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment or by a fine greater than
$200.60 The legislature deleted a proposed provision that would have al-
lowed courts to impose fines up to $10,000 on individuals convicted of
violent crimes.6' Legislative estimates project that under the current Act,
the collection of additional court costs should yield approximately two
million dollars annually. 62
II. THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOI VICTIM COMPENSATION
Commentators traditionally have advanced two theories to justify the
state's assumption of the duty to compensate crime victims. 63 An exami-
nation of these theoretical justifications is essential to an analysis of the
restrictions and qualifications embodied in the Act. The first theory is that
of "state obligation. ' 64 The state obligation theory postulates that the state
is under a duty to protect the citizenry and that when a person is criminally
injured the state has failed in this duty; consequently, the state is obligated
to compensate the victim. 65 The state's obligation further arises from the
fact that the laws of the state prevent the victim from seeking personal
retribution against the criminal and impede the victims' civil recovery by
incarcerating the criminal.66 The second theory, the social welfare the-
ory,67 is predicated upon moral considerations. This theory postulates that
"an innocent victim ought to be entitled to aid, to maintain that degree of
dignity, security, and comfort which he seeks to earn for himself and his
family,"'68 and that the state should provide this aid.
At least one author has recognized that the provision for the general
welfare is merely a motive behind victim compensation legislation, not a
justification for it.69 The social welfare theory begs the question; the state's
power to provide for the general welfare offers no explanation for the
state's exercise of the power in this particular instance. Yet for some, the
state's moral obligation is sufficient reason for victim compensation pro-
the offender. Since the funding provisions of the Texas Act are similar to those of Florida,
Texas should expect a challenge similar to that in Champe.
60. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 14b (Vernon Supp. 1980).
61. Proposed S.B. 21 was amended Apr. 26, 1979, to delete § 15. House Floor Amend-
ments to S.B. 21, TEX. H.R.J. 1903 (1979). A remnant of old § 15 may be seen in § 3(10),
which defines crimes of violence although there is no longer any reference to crimes of
violence in the Act. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(10) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
62. Fiscal Note accompanying S.B. 21, Apr. 10, 1979.
63. See Galaway & Rutman, Victim Compensation. An Analysis of Substantive Issues, in
CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supra note 10, at 421-22; Schafer, Victim Compensation and Re-
sponsibility, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 55, 58-59 (1970).
64. Schafer, supra note 63, at 58.
65. See McAdam, supra note 5, at 351.
66. The argument that the state impedes the victim's civil recovery by incarcerating the
criminal is somewhat incongruous with the argument that the state is at fault for not appre-
hending the criminal; nevertheless, both are often advanced together. See, e.g., Galaway &
Rutman, supra note 63, at 421-22.
67. See Schafer, supra note 11, at 48.
68. Note, The New Jersey Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 727,
728-29 (1974) (quoting N.J. VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION BOARD, FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT 5 (1973)).
69. McAdam, supra note 5, at 351.
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grams. The distinguished English jurist Rupert Cross stated, "If there is a
widely recognized hardship, and if that hardship can be cheaply remedied
by state compensation, I should have thought that the case for such a rem-
edy was made out, provided the practical difficulties are not too great." 70
The state obligation theory appears to provide a sounder basis for victim
compensation programs than does the social welfare theory, but its prem-
ises are rather questionable. The state obligation theory is predicated
upon the failure of the state to protect the victim; however, ascribing fault
to the state is erroneous. 71 The criminal is at fault, and to place blame on
the state is to engage in a fiction and to ignore the individual will of the
criminal.72 A state cannot protect all people at all times, and it is debata-
ble whether a state should attempt to do so.
Other theories advanced in justification of compensation programs are
often merely additional benefits of such legislation, not underlying justifi-
cations. Among these prospective benefits are the increased cooperation
with law enforcement agencies engendered by eligibility requirements,73
anti-alienation of the victim, 74 and even the political benefit accruing to
sponsors of victim compensation who act because "this . . . is what the
people want."7 5
If a primary justification for the state's assumption of the duty to com-
pensate victims must be identified, perhaps it is that the state is in the best
position to spread the severe losses incurred by a relatively small group of
victims. The loss-spreading function of victim compensation programs has
long been recognized, 76 but rarely suggested as a justification for state
compensation. 77 A state's unique ability to spread these losses efficiently,
combined with a state's general duty to provide for the public welfare,
implicates a state duty to establish these programs. In a sense, victim com-
pensation may be viewed as the statutory analogue of the common law
doctrine of vicarious liability. In both cases, liability is not based on fault
but is imposed with the belief that it is better to subject all of society to
70. Cross, Compensating Victims of Violence, THE LISTENER 815, 816 (May 16, 1963),
quoted in Childres, supra note 23, at 448.
71. Childres, supra note 23, at 455.
72. Id.
73. See McAdam, supra note 5, at 353.
74. For a discussion of the theory of victim anti-alienation, see text accompanying note
100 infra.
75. See MCADAM, supra note 5, at 353.
76. Margery Fry, the English penal reformer who is frequently given credit for the re-
birth of victim compensation, spoke of the loss-spreading aspects of victim compensation in
her seminal article. Fry, Justice for Victims, 8 J. PuB. L. 191, 192-93 (1959).
77. Robert Childres, an influential commentator during the nascent stages of state vic-
tim compensation stated:
[A] sufficient, independent basis for compensation rests on common sense
rather than the metaphysics of causation and responsibility. Endemic losses
ought to be spread. That violence and damage criminally inflicted are en-
demic to American society cannot be disputed. This premise alone is a suffi-
cient basis for the conclusion that the damage ought to be spread among all
potential victims.
Childres, supra note 23, at 457.
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small increments of loss rather than to allow individuals to suffer radical
shifts in their economic status. 78 Under the doctrine of vicarious liability,
society must eventually shoulder the loss incurred by an individual injured
by a negligent employee; the loss is reflected in the goods purchased from
the employer, and thereby society pays the true cost of the goods.79 Like-
wise, victim compensation programs allow the loss suffered by a crime vic-
tim to be reflected as a true cost of living in society, either directly, through
the imposition of taxes, or indirectly, by the assessment of criminal fines. 80
III. CONTROVERSIAL RESTRICTIONS IN THE TEXAS ACT
The assumption that loss-spreading is the primary justification of the
state's duty to compensate victims of crime raises questions concerning the
validity of some of the major restrictions on recovery included in the Texas
Act. Certain provisions bear no relation to either the loss-spreading or the
state obligation theories. These provisions include the exclusion of victims
who live in the same household with the criminal,8' and the requirement
that the victim, regardless of the size of his loss, show that he will suffer
financial stress as a result of his injury.82 These two requirements are par-
ticularly important because of the breadth of their application. This Com-
ment, therefore, examines these restrictions in light of the reasons offered
for their support and the detrimental effects they may cause.
A. Financial Stress
Perhaps the most contentious issue concerning victim compensation leg-
islation today is whether recovery should be contingent upon a showing of
financial need or stress. Those in favor of such a requirement claim that
fiscal limitations demand a restriction on program outlays because a needs
requirement will cut back on the total amount awarded and thereby ensure
compensation for the neediest individuals. 83 The proponents of need re-
quirements are invariably the legislators, perhaps because legislators are
naturally most sensitive to the potential budgetary ramifications of pro-
posed legislation. 84 Objective commentators and experienced victim com-
pensation program administrators,85 however, have rarely favored
78. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 759-64 (1956).
79. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961).
80. The method of funding adopted by Texas, the imposition of additional fines upon
criminal offenders, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 8309-1, § 14(c) (Vernon Supp. 1980),
may be seen as a partial recapture by society of the loss suffered as a result of the crimes. In
a sense, under the Texas method, society pays the cost of victim compensation in advance.
81. Id. § 6(c)(4).
82. Id. § 6(c)(3).
83. See Note, Virginia Adopts Statute to Compensate the Victims of Crime, II U. RICH.
L. REV. 679, 682 (1977).
84. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 18, at 31-35.
85. In an opinion survey taken of 20 victim compensation program administrators, only
three felt that the victim's need should be a prerequisite in making an award. Brooks, Crime




requirements of financial need or stress; in fact, many ardently oppose
such provisions. 86 Nevertheless, approximately half of the states with vic-
tim compensation plans use some sort of financial means test. 87 The Texas
Act includes a typical provision: "The board shall deny the application if:
. . . the claimant will not suffer financial stress as a result of the pecuniary
loss arising out of the criminally injurious conduct. ' 88 The generally ac-
cepted reason for the inclusion of such a provision is the anticipated reduc-
tion in expenditures. 89 Whether it is reasonable to anticipate a substantial
reduction in expenditures is a question that this Comment addresses later
in this section, after the general undesirability of financial stress tests is
examined.
General Undesirability of a Financial Stress Test. A financial stress test is
undesirable for a number of philosophical and practical reasons. The re-
quirement that a claimant show financial need essentially changes the fo-
cus of the program from the compensation of crime victims to the
provision of welfare.90 As mentioned earlier, one of the primary goals of a
victim compensation program should be to spread effectively the losses re-
sulting from crime related injuries,91 and this goal can only be achieved by
adopting a restitutionary approach that ignores the economic status of the
victim. Instead of functioning as a loss-spreading device, an act including
a financial stress test serves to reallocate wealth by limiting eligibility for
recovery to those who meet a certain standard of need. While compensa-
tion programs are admittedly enacted to benefit the general welfare, they
should not be transformed into welfare programs because victims of crime
are not limited to any one income group.92 The drafters of the Uniform
86. See, e.g., Childres, supra note 23, at 462; H. EDELHERTZ & G. GElS, supra note 18,
at 83-85.
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13964(2) (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.13(7)
(West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(d) (Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 346.140(3) (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(0(1) (1973 & Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 18.361(5) (West Supp. 1967-1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631.6 (McKinney 1972);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 19.2-
368.13 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.06(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980) use financial
means tests. ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(3)(c) (1974 & Supp. 1979), allows consideration of
financial need, but does not require a showing of need.
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Financial
stress is defined in id. § 3(6):
(6) "Financial stress" means financial hardship experienced by a claimant
as a result of pecuniary loss from criminally injurious conduct giving rise to a
claim under this Act. A claimant suffers financial stress only if he or she can-
not maintain his or her customary level of health, safety, and education for
himself or herself and his or her dependents without undue financial hardship.
In making its finding, the board shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(A) the number of the claimant's dependents;
(B) the usual living expenses of the claimant and his or her family;
(C) the special needs of the claimant and his.or her dependents;
(D) the claimant's income and potential earning capacity; and
(E) the claimant's resources.
89. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 32.
90. Id. at 91-92.
91. See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
92. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 12, at 318.
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Crime Victims Reparations Act recognized the danger of this transforma-
tion: "If the test is included, however, a real threat to the integrity of the
program is posed because a strict 'needs' requirement will limit benefits of
the program to persons already on welfare and thus be merely an exercise
in bookkeeping. '93
In addition to these problems, the financial stress test creates substantial
practical difficulties. Instead of focusing on the claimant's injury, the
Board will spend a great deal of time investigating the claimant's wealth.
The amount of administrative effort directed at the determination of
financial need should not be underestimated. The New York Crime Vic-
tims Compensation Board consistently reported that the most difficult
problem faced was the determination of serious financial hardship.
94
Thus, the financial stress test certainly will substantially increase the time
required to process each claim, as well as distract the administrators from
other investigatory tasks. Perhaps more importantly, the procedure for
determining financial stress is necessarily demeaning.95 Each applicant
will be forced to divulge whatever private financial information the Board
considers necessary for its decision.96 The victim cannot help feeling that
he is on trial when he is put in the uncomfortable position of proving he is
poor enough to deserve recovery.97 A California Board official charged
with coordinating the determination of need stated:
[Ilt's making the program exceedingly unpopular because the people
come in again and again and say because I was frugal, because I saved
a dollar, I'm being deprived of my compensation, whereas the man
who threw the money away, or the woman who threw it away, is go-
ing to get money from you. This story you hear over and over again,
and the Board is getting sick of it. 98
The public sentiment expressed against the programs using a need re-
quirement bears on another issue. One of the recognized benefits of victim
compensation programs is the anti-alienating effect on individual vic-
tims. 99 Theoretically, state-provided compensation for victims should help
dissipate the disillusionment of individuals who, having suffered criminal
injuries, suffer additionally through losses of time and income incurred as
a result of their attempts to cooperate in prosecution efforts.' 00 If victims
who innocently suffered are denied compensation because their income
level is not low enough, this achievement is likely to go unrealized. In fact,
the experience of other states suggests that, if anything, the programs that
use a financial stress test increase alienation.' 0 '
93. UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT § 5(g), Comment.
94. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 18, at 58-59.
95. Id. at 272.
96. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 4(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980) allows the
Board to require that an application contain whatever information it considers necessary.
97. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 18, at 62-63 (applicant stated upon leav-
ing hearing: "I feel like a criminal").
98. Id. at 92.
99. Schafer, supra note 1I, at 48.
100. Id.
101. The chairman of the New York Board has been quoted as remarking at a confer-
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The Fiscal Benefit. Although the detrimental effects of the financial stress
requirement are widely recognized, Texas and a large number of other
states have included such provisions in their victim compensation statutes.
As previously mentioned, the popularity of the stress requirements can be
attributed to the legislative perception that such restrictions will result in
substantial fiscal savings. On the whole, however, the savings to be
achieved from these provisions have been greatly overestimated. First, the
administrative costs associated with the financial stress test are perhaps the
highest of any one phase of the investigatory procedure.' 0 2 In addition to
the time spent analyzing financial data submitted by the claimant, officials
will necessarily spend a great deal of time cross-checking this information
with employers, banks, and other sources. 103 The Board will have to make
an individual judgment in each case, weighing the factors specified in the
Act as well as any additional standards it may choose to adopt. 10 4 Sec-
ondly, those individuals who would be excluded by a financial stress test
are very likely to be compensated by some collateral source, such as insur-
ance, medicare, or workers' compensation. 15 Thus, to the extent of the
collateral compensation, these victims would be precluded from recovery
irrespective of the financial stress test. 10 6 Furthermore, wealthier victims
are less likely to be willing to go through the compensation process to re-
cover a relatively small loss. 10
7
The combination of the substantial increase in administrative cost and
the fact that a large number of those who would be excluded by the
financial stress test would also be excluded by other restrictions indicates
that the fiscal benefits of the test are not likely to be very large. The New
York Board has estimated that the elimination of the stress test from the
New York program would result in only an additional $150,000 in overall
expenditures, an increase of ten percent.' 0
8
The decision to adopt or retain a financial stress test involves a compari-
son of the fiscal benefits of the provision with the potential detrimental
effects. Considering the probability that a relatively small increase in costs
would result from an abandonment of the test, the victim alienation and
the inequitable denials of recovery that will accompany the test should
compel the abandonment of the financial stress requirement. The majority
ence of compensation board administrators, "I don't know about you, but the letters we get
no newspaper would publish, believe you me, when we turn down someone on serious
financial hardship." H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 59.
102. Id. at 272.
103. See Comment, New York Crime Victims Compensation Act. Four Years Later, 7
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 25, 31 (1971).
104. In determining financial stress, the Board is to "consider all relevant factors," in-
cluding those listed in §§ 3(6)(A)-(E). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 3(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1980).
105. See Geis, California's New Crime Victim Compensation Statute, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 880, 904 (1974).
106. See note 37 supra.
107. See Geis, supra note 105, at 904.
108. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GELS, supra note 18, at 59. This figure is based on the expected
increase in awards minus the expected administrative savings.
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of administrators of existing programs, as -well as most commentators, op-
pose basing victim compensation programs on need and recognize that it is
preferable that administrators spend their limited time processing claims
instead of prying into innocent victims' private affairs. 10 9 This Comment,
therefore, proposes that the financial stress provision of the Texas Act be
deleted.
B. The Relational Exclusion
Almost every compensation program in existence contains some type of
relational" l0 exclusion provision.'"I These provisions establish a class of
victims who, regardless of the severity of their need, are denied compensa-
tion solely because a statutorily prescribed relationship exists between
them and the criminal responsible for their injury. In some states this rela-
tionship is defined by degrees of consanguinity. 1 2 A number of states
deny recovery to victims involved in sexual relationships with the crimi-
nal, 113 while others limit the exclusion to those victims residing in the same
household as the criminal. 1 4 These three provisions are sometimes com-
bined within a single statute.' 15 The Texas Act uses the household exclu-
sion: "The board shall deny the application if. . . the victim resided in
the same household as the offender or his or her accomplice."' 116 Unfortu-
nately, the Act does not define "household,"" ' 7 nor does it specify whether
109. Texas narrowly missed disqualification for federal subsidization under the 1979
Victims of Crime Act bill, H.R. 957, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). H.R. 957 is the result of
conference committee compromises of the 1977 bill, H.R. 7010, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The Senate had proposed an amendment to H.R. 7010 that would exclude from federal
subsidization states using means tests.
The conferees note that Senator Kennedy, one of the managers on the part
of the Senate, believes quite strongly that States receiving funds under this Act
should not impose financial means tests when determining eligibility. He be-
lieves that no innocent victim of a crime should be required to bear the eco-
nomic burden of a crime, that a uniform standard of eligibility should be used
nationwide, that means tests are not only arbitrary but also demeaning, that
such tests may have the effect of discouraging claimants from applying for
compensation, and that there has been no conclusive showing that such tests
are cost effective.
H.R. REP. No. 1762, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978). The conference committee decided not
to adopt the Senate amendment, however, reasoning that in light of the relatively small
(25%) federal contribution to the state programs, the states should be free to make their own
determinations concerning the desirability of a means test. Id.
110. The term "relational" is used in this Comment to describe exclusions based on some
relationship between the victim and the criminal. These exclusions are sometimes referred
to as familial, but this term fails to describe the variety of relationships that may give rise to
exclusion.
11l. Only California and Delaware do not have relational exclusions.
112. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 2(d) (1973).
113. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130(b)(2) (Supp. 1979).
114. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.354(4)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
115. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-211(b) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.04(2) (West
Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 346.050(2) (1977).
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(c)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
117. The statutory appearance of the word "household" has previously caused disagree-
ment. Cf. Gaston v. Gardner, 247 F. Supp. 441 (D.S.C. 1965) (interpretation of "house-
hold" determinative of child's right to social security benefits). The Michigan Act expressly
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
the exclusion applies only to those residing together at the time of the inci-
dent or to those who have resided together at any time in the past." t 8 For
example, whether the exclusion would apply to a wife assaulted by her
husband when the couple had separated one week before the incident is
unclear.
The household exclusion may yield a harsh result. The most obvious
example occurs in the case of interspousal murder. When a husband
murders his wife, the children suddenly find themselves alone, their
mother dead and their father in jail. No victims are more innocent nor
more deserving of society's aid than such children. Yet because these vic-
tims of crime resided with their parents, they are denied funds that the
state distributes to others in far less need." 19
The household exclusion does not contribute to the program's goal of
loss-spreading because there is no reason to assume that pecuniary loss
suffered as a result of a crime committed by a co-resident should be less
severe than a loss accompanying an injury suffered at the hands of a stran-
ger. Commentators, however, generally advance four justifications to sup-
port the policy of relational exclusion: (1) prevention of fraud and
collusion; 120 (2) prevention of the criminal from benefiting from his
crime;' 21 (3) limitation of expenditures; 122 and (4) avoidance of grants to
victims who are partially responsible for the crime. 123 While these argu-
ments all involve valid considerations, they either are based on assump-
tions that have proven invalid in light of experience, or focus on problems
that can adequately be solved through more equitable alternative methods.
Fraud, Collusion, and Indirect Benefit. The first two arguments in favor of
relational exclusions are conceptually linked. Those who favor a rela-
tional exclusion fear that the relative or co-resident responsible for the in-
jury will ultimately benefit from his or her act through the compensation
allowed the victim. Similarly, when the victim and the offender are ac-
quainted, the proponents of relational exclusions perceive a greater oppor-
tunity for fraud and collusion. Little if any merit attaches to either of these
arguments, however, especially since the problems of fraud and indirect
benefit are adequately prevented by other provisions of the Act.
In the first place, the victim must suffer physical injury in order to be
eligible, 124 and then he can recover only for documented pecuniary loss
excludes domestic employees from the household exclusion. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 18.354(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979).
118. The statutes of other states are generally quite clear as to the time of cohabitation
that will cause an exclusion. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130(b)(2) (1974 & Supp. 1979)
(cohabitation at time of incident).
119. See Note, Illinois' Crime Victims Compensation Act, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 351, 359-61
(1976).
120. See McAdam, supra note 5, at 361-63.
121. See Brooks, How Well Are Criminal Injury Compensation Programs Performing?, 21
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 50, 54 (1975).
122. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 269.
123. Id.
124. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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such as medical expenses. 125 The number of people willing to injure them-
selves seriously enough to require medical attention in order to defraud
the program is likely to be negligible. If an individual wanted to defraud
the program by seeking recovery for an accidental injury, he could blame
an imaginary stranger instead of a relative. 126
The Act's requirement for cooperation with the local law enforcement
agency,' 27 however, most strongly rebuts both the indirect benefit and
fraud arguments. In order to be eligible for compensation, a claimant
must report the crime within seventy-two hours128 and fully cooperate with
the police.129 Presumably, this cooperation involves filing a complaint and
aiding in all prosecutorial efforts. In order to benefit from his crime, there-
fore, the criminal would first sacrifice his freedom. Furthermore, the vic-
tim's willingness to prosecute should operate to create a rebuttable
presumption of a lack of collusion.130
Finally, those who cling to the indirect benefit theory can be satisfied by
an alternative to relational exclusions that does not result in the exclusion
of a large class of innocent and needy victims. The drafters of the Uni-
form Crime Victims Reparations Act have abandoned the relational exclu-
sion in favor of a more equitable test: "Reparations may not be awarded
to a claimant who is the offender or an accomplice of the offender, nor to
any claimant if the award would unjustly benefit the offender or accom-
plice."' 131 In addition to the unjust benefit clause, the Uniform Crime Vic-
tims Reparations Act includes an optional addendum that creates a
presumption of unjust benefit in certain relational situations. This section
is to be used or omitted "according to the legislative appraisal of the op-
tions involved."' 132 Although this addendum could cause a hardship in
certain circumstances, 133 it is preferable to the absolute exclusions in com-
mon usage, for it gives the Board an option:
[Unless the Board determines that the interests of justice otherwise
require in a particular case, reparations may not be awarded to the
spouse of, or a person living in the same household with, the offender
or his accomplice or to the parent, child, brother, or sister of the of-
fender or his accomplice.]134
North Dakota 135 and Ohio I36 have both adopted the Uniform Crime
125. Id. § 7(a)(l).
126. Program reports from various states have revealed that the fraud that was expected
to accompany the programs has simply not materialized. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS,
supra note 18, at 279-81.
127. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
128. Id. § 6(c)(1).
129. Id. § 6(d)(I).
130. See Note, supra note 119, at 359.
131. UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT.§ 5(C).
132. Id. § 5(c), Comment.
133. One author has suggested that a rebuttable presumption of unjust benefit might
cause a hardship on children seeking recovery. McAdam, supra note 5, at 362.
134. UNIFORM CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS ACT § 5(c) (brackets in original).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-06(3) (Supp. 1979).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(B) (Page Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
Victims Reparations Act exclusions, and the head of the North Dakota
program has evaluated the provision as valuable and equitable. 137
Fiscal Considerations and the Particiatory Theory. Members of society
generally perceive that a high proportion of violent crimes occur in domes-
tic settings. 138 Garnering additional support from the indirect benefit the-
ory, legislators have included relational exclusions with the view that the
elimination of this large class of claimants will ease the constraints of a
limited budget. Yet the experience of the New York program, which em-
ploys a familial exclusion, 139 suggests that such financial benefits have
been overestimated. In the first four years of the program, of 3,238 claims
filed, 1,380 were denied. 140 Only seventeen of these 1,380 denials were
based on the relationship between the offender and the victim. 14
Nevertheless, the emendation of the household exclusion undeniably
would result in an increase in administrative costs, even though the actual
increase in claims may be negligible. An increase in administrative costs is
likely because it is probable that more administrative time will be spent in
examining the possibility of victim participation in an interfamilial crime
than in a crime committed by a stranger. 42 In fact, the idea that the vic-
tim of an interfamilial crime is usually partially responsible for the crime is
a multifarious concept underlying the exclusions. 143 When a wife has been
severely beaten by her husband, the police, the courts, and the community
too often believe that "'she must have done something terrible to provoke
such a response."' "44 The public perception of victim participation in in-
terfamilial crimes, however, cannot justify the relational exclusion because
the Act already includes a provision for reducing recovery to the extent
that the victim precipitated the crime, and every claim will be examined in
this light.' 45 Although the Board possibly might choose to devote more
time to the determination of victim precipitation in interfamilial crimes,
precluding a sizeable class of victims from recovery on the mere suspicion
137. Gross, supra note 12, at 35. Indiana has responded directly to the inequitable po-
tential of the relational exclusion by limiting exceptions to the exclusion of legal non-spousal
dependents of the criminal:
A person who commits a violent crime upon which an application is based,
or an accomplice of that person or a member of the family of that person, is
not eligible for assistance under this chapter, However, if the victim is a legal
non-spousal dependent of the person who commits a violent crime, compensa-
tion may be awarded where justice requires.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.6-5(b) (Bums Supp. 1979).
138. See H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 269. This perception is somewhat
distorted because the Department of Justice estimates that less than 10% of all aggravated
assaults are inflicted upon relatives. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 12, at 334-35. The public
perception finds justification in the statistics of murder, however, for approximately 30% of
all murders are either interfamilial (22%) or romantically related (7%). Id. at 457.
139. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 624(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979).
140. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIs, supra note 18, at 43.
141. Id. at 53.
142. Id. at 269.
143. Id.
144. T. DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME 74 (1978).
145. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 6(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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that the investigation of their claims will prove more costly than another
group of claimants is unjust.
In summary, no valid reason exists for the exclusion of the broad classes
of victims affected by the relational exclusion provisions. The fears of
fraud and collusion are rendered nugatory by the requirement for coopera-
tion in the apprehension and prosecution of the victim. The possibility of
indirect benefit to the criminal is also lessened by the cooperation require-
ment and may be eliminated completely by the adoption of the Uniform
Crime Victims Reparations Act proposal. 146 The fiscal benefits accruing to
a program from relational exclusions are minimal, and neither the slight
decrease in claims nor the reduction of administrative costs associated with
an undocumented perception of victim precipitation justifies the exclusion
of a large class of innocent victims.
IV. THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE PUBLICITY AND EFFECTIVE CLAIM
FORMS
While the need for adequate publicity cannot be termed a legal issue,
the extent of public education and information largely determines the ef-
fectiveness of any compensation statute. How the public is informed, the
ease of access to the application forms, and the nature of the forms them-
selves can have a substantial impact on the number of claims filed and the
amount of administrative effort spent in processing claims.
The experience of the New York program demonstrates the relation be-
tween public awareness and the number of victims aided. The New York
program was underpublicized; after four years some prosecutors were una-
ware of its existence. 147 Even today, there is no statutory provision for
publicity and, although initially several short-lived media "blitzes" were
attempted, 148 the chairman of the compensation board has admitted that
the largest number of claims arise from knowledge of the program ob-
tained by word of mouth.149 In 1969, the third year of the program's oper-
ation, only 929 claims were filed.' 50 In that same year, New York law
enforcement agencies received 40,049 reports of murder, manslaughter,
rape, and aggravated assault.' 5' Despite the benevolent intent underlying
compensation programs, if the victims themselves are not informed of the
availability of state compensation, the programs will be "nothing more
than public placebos, tranquilizing showpieces aimed at placating the pub-
lic and protecting the politician, all for a negligible price."'152
Fortunately, Texas has taken steps to avoid this problem. Sections 10(e)
and (f) of the Texas Act provide:
146. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
147. King, If You Are Maimed by a Criminal You Can Be Compensated (Maybe), N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
148. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 46.
149. Id.
150. Comment, supra note 103, at 35.
151. Id. at 34.
152. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 18, at 238.
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(e) Every hospital licensed under the laws of this state shall dis-
play prominently in its emergency room posters giving notification of
the existence and general provisions of this Act. The board shall set
standards for the location of the display and shall provide posters,
application forms, and general information regarding this Act to each
hospital and physician licensed to practice in the State of Texas.
(f) Every local law enforcement agency shall inform victims of
criminally injurious conduct of the provisions of this Act and provide
application forms to victims who desire to seek assistance. The board
shall provide application forms and all other documents that local law
enforcement agencies may require to comply with this section. The
attorney general shall set standards to be followed by local law en-
forcement agencies for this purpose and may require them to file with
him or her a description of the procedures adopted by each agency to
comply.
These provisions closely resemble those adopted by California after that
state experienced difficulties similar to those of New York. 5 3
While the Texas Act is admirable for its inclusion of such a provision, it
is crucial that the provisions be vigorously applied. Furthermore, law en-
forcement agencies must develop an efficient procedure for the dissemina-
tion of information. Finally, in addition to the statutorily prescribed
publicity, the Board should use mass media to publicize the Act and de-
velop adequate screening procedures to cope with the number of claims
generated from such publicity.
Apart from the lesson learned from the New York experience, two other
factors demonstrate that publicity requires particular attention. First, al-
though the statute speaks in unequivocal language, directing that "[e]very
hospital. . . shall display. . .[and] [e]very local law enforcement agency
shall inform . . . .-1154 it provides no sanction for noncompliance with
these duties. The absence of a statutory sanction requires the close moni-
toring of the compliance of hospitals and law enforcement agencies. If
cooperation is not received, perhaps a penalty for noncompliance should
be added to the statute, Secondly, the Act divides the control of publicity
between the Board and the attorney general. Although the Board is in
charge of providing application forms to the law enforcement agencies,155
the attorney general is responsible for setting the standards for the distri-
bution of these forms.156 Since the manner of distribution and procedural
organization has a substantial impact on the choice of the claim form, 57
the attorney general and the Board must work closely together to assure a
smooth operation. At one time the California program involved the same
division of authority. 158 Apparently, the split proved unwieldy in practice,
153. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13968(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1980); see Geis, supra note 105, at
885.
154. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 10(e)-(f) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (empha-
sis added).
155. Id. § 10(0.
156. Id.
157. See Gross, supra note 12, at 20.
158. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13968(c) (1974) (amended by 1977 Cal. Stats. ch. 636, § 4).
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for California amended its act in 1977 by placing all authority for law
enforcement publicity procedures in the hands of the administrative
agency in charge of the compensation program. 5 9
For the present, the Texas attorney general controls the procedure by
which Texas law enforcement agencies distribute information. 160 Since
the Act places a duty upon every local law enforcement agency to provide
information and application forms to every victim of criminally injurious
conduct, the police are essentially the public representatives of the Board,
and their efforts are likely to account for the majority of claims filed. The
procedures adopted for the distribution of this information will influence
the effectiveness of the program, but the limited manpower and budget of
law enforcement agencies conflict with the need for widespread distribu-
tion of information and applications. Faced with this conflict, California
has developed a system for the dissemination of information that promises
to be effective as well as efficient, and Texas should consider the adoption
of a similar plan. In a memo sent to all local law enforcement agencies,
California Attorney General Younger outlined the standard procedure:
(1) Law enforcement officers are required to provide to victims of
[sic] their families a sheet describing the victim program and where to
obtain application forms. This sheet shall also identify a Victims of
Violent Crime Liaison Officer and his telephone number. Every re-
porting officer shall indicate in his police report the date when poten-
tial claimants were provided with the sheet. Alternatively, a law
enforcement agency may devise a system whereby potential claimants
are notified by mail of the availability of the program and are advised
of the name of the Liaison Officer from whom further information
may be obtained;
(2) All law enforcement agencies shall appoint a Victims of Violent
Crime Liaison Officer. This officer will coordinate closely with the
State Board of Control and shall obtain from the Board application
forms which are to be disseminated to the interested public;
(3) The program shall be discussed in general agency meetings and
new and trainee officers shall be made aware of the program's exist-
ence. 16'
The establishment of a liaison officer serves several purposes. The local
agency will benefit from this centralization of responsibility because less
time will have to be spent on the education of the entire force. The public
will benefit because such an officer will become well-versed in the provi-
sions of the Act and, as a result, will be able to respond to specific inquiries
with greater accuracy. The Board will benefit because a liaison officer can
serve as a watchdog by checking that the information is being distributed
in accordance with the statutory mandate.
Although the statutory delegation of publicity duties to law enforcement
159. Id. (West Supp. 1980). The chief administrator of the North Dakota Crime Victims
Compensation Board requested that all sections concerning the attorney general's participa-
tion be eliminated. See Gross, supra note 12, at 29.
160. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 10(f) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
161. IssuEs, supra note 43, at 15.
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agencies establishes an efficient device for information distribution, the po-
lice can only inform those who report a crime. Over fifty percent of all
personal victimizations go unreported.162 The Act attempts to lower this
percentage in Texas by conditioning eligibility on a report of the crime to
the appropriate agency within seventy-two hours. 163 If this ancillary goal
of increased crime reporting is to be reached, information about the Act,
and the seventy-two hour provision in particular, should be conveyed by
sources other than the police. In all likelihood, the best way to reach those
who would otherwise choose to avoid involvement with law enforcement
agencies is through extensive media coverage. The wide reach of the me-
dia, however, creates additional problems. The New York Board discov-
ered that media "blitzes" resulted in a deluge of claims filed by individuals
clearly ineligible for recovery, persons seeking a government handout, or
persons looking for lost property. 164 These claims resulted in serious ad-
ministrative backlogs, and the media efforts were quickly discontinued. 65
The problems experienced by the New York Board may perhaps be
avoided, however, by the adoption of a simple claim procedure. Besides
eliminating the increase in applications of ineligible individuals, this pro-
cedure generally will reduce the amount of screening that would otherwise
be performed by the limited staff of the Board. This procedure, already
used in North Dakota and Minnesota, 166 consists of a two-stage claim
process, Before a potential claimant is allowed to fill out a claim form, he
or she must fill out a "declaration of eligibility." 167 This declaration would
162. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 12, at 302.
163. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 4(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
164. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GElS, supra note 18, at 46.
165. Id. at 46-47.
166. See Gross, supra note 12, at 20, 26.
167. The following is a proposed declaration of eligibility form for Texas, adapted from




By completing this form you determine whether you are eligible to apply for
compensation under the Texas Crime Victims Compensation Act. Check the
statements that apply in your case. If you cannot truthfully check all state-
ments, you are not eligible for compensation through the Act and you will not
receive a claim form.
- 1. The incident for which I am declaring my eligibility for compensation
occurred on or after January 1, 1980.
- 2. The claimant (and/or victim) suffered bodily injury (or death) as a
result of the criminal actions of another.
- 3. This injury (or death) was not the result of an automobile accident.
- 4. The incident occurred in Texas.
5. The incident was reported to law enforcement officials within 72 hours
or would have been reported except for a valid excuse.
- 6. The claimant (and/or victim) cooperated with law enforcement offi-
cials during their investigation of the incident.
- 7. The person whose death or injury gives rise to this claim did not know-
ingly and willingly participate in the criminal incident.
8. The claimant (and/or victim) did not reside in the same household as
the criminal offender or his or her accomplice.
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consist of a series of statements concerning threshold eligibility, such as
"The incident occurred in Texas." The applicant could only receive a
claim form after responding affirmatively to each of the statements on the
declaration of eligibility form. Each form should also include a warning to
the applicant that it is a class A misdemeanor knowingly to respond falsely
to the questions posed in the form. 168 The use of the declaration of eligi-
bility form would screen out the obviously ineligible applicants, and
thereby facilitate the use of the media by preventing a deluge of frivolous
claims from reaching the administrative stage. In addition, this procedure
should lower administrative costs and thus increase the availability of
funds to victims.
Efforts directed toward publicity are likely to have a direct effect on the
success of the Texas program, and the Texas Act reflects recognition of
that fact. The publicity provisions of the Act must be administered with a
strong hand, however, and the attorney general should consider adopting a
procedure for police publicity and application distribution similar to that
of California. Moreover, the Board should take advantage of the mass
media to assure full exposure and to help increase police cooperation. The
adoption of a declaration of eligibility claim form would ease the extra
administrative burden that media exposure can cause.
V. THE SON OF SAM PROVISION
Immediately prior to the final passage of Senate Bill 21,169 sections 16
through 18 were added to the Act by a house floor amendment. 70 The
- 9. This claim is being filed within 180 days of the incident.
-.10. The person whose death or injury gives rise to this claim was a Texas
resident at the time of the crime.
I hereby swear that all of the above statements to which I have attested are
true, and understand that I will be guilty of a class A misdemeanor for any
false statement I have made in connection with this declaration of eligibility.
Signature
168. Although the Act does not expressly provide a penal sanction for falsification of
application forms, such a falsification would qualify as a violation of TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.10 (Vernon 1974).
169. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 189, §§ 1-19, at 402-10 (Vernon).
170. House Floor Amendments, Apr. 26, 1979, amendment No. 3, added the following
sections to the Act:
Escrow account
Sec. 16. Every firm, person, corporation, association, or other legal entity
contracting with a person or the representative or assignee of any person, ac-
cused or convicted of crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of the
crime in a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record,
radio or television presentation, live entertainment, or from the expression of
the accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions re-
garding the crime shall submit a copy of the contract to the board and pay to
the board any money that would otherwise by terms of the contract be owing
to the accused or convicted person or his representatives. The board shall
deposit the money in an escrow account.
Funds available to victim
Sec. 17. Money placed in an escrow account is available to satisfy a judg-
ment against the accused or convicted person in favor of a victim of the crime
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enactment of these sections establishes in Texas a modified version of New
York's controversial "Son of Sam" law. 17 1 These sections are inappropri-
ate in a victim compensation statute because they create no new substan-
tive rights or remedies for victims.172 Instead, the Son of Sam sections
prevent the criminal from disposing of assets received from his crime-re-
lated literary efforts so that the victim will be able to pursue an ordinary
civil remedy with the assurance that the defendant will not be judgment
proof. Underlying this practical consideration is the sentiment that
criminals should not profit from their misdeeds. Despite the admirable
motives behind these sections, the Son of Sam provision presents potential
constitutional problems. 173
Sections 16 through 18 provide that any person contracting with an ac-
cused 174 or convicted criminal with respect to the reenactment of the crime
in a book, movie, or other medium, or merely with respect to the criminal's
thoughts or feelings about the crime, must pay the Board the money that
would otherwise be paid to the criminal under the contract. 75 The Board
is then to establish an escrow account with that money, which will be
available for the satisfaction of any civil judgment awarded to a victim for
damages caused by the crime. 176 Unless the money is used to satisfy a
judgment for the victim, it will be returned to the criminal after five
years. ' 77
if the court in which the judgment is taken finds that the judgment is for dam-
ages incurred by the victim caused by the commission of the crime.
Maintenance of escrow account
Sec. 18. The board shall pay money in an escrow account to the accused
person if he is acquitted of the crime. The board shall pay the money in the
account to the accused or convicted person if five years elapse from the date
when the account was established and the money has not been ordered paid to
a victim in satisfaction of a judgment.
171. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979). Section 632-a is commonly
referred to as the Son of Sam law because the proposal of the bill was directly motivated by
the series of random murders committed by a person calling himself Son of Sam and the
willingness of publishers to pay large amounts of money for the murderer's story. See Com-
ment, Compensating the Victim From the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story-The Constitution-
ality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 93, 94 n.6 (1978) (statement
of justification by sponsor of § 632-a).
172. Victim compensation programs distribute funds directly to the victims, thus creating
an alternate source of recovery. The Son of Sam sections merely impose upon the criminal's
rights by preventing him from disposing of the profits from his crime related literary efforts,
thereby ostensibly augmenting the victim's chances for traditional civil recovery.
173. See notes 185-90 infra and accompanying text.
174. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1980). There is no
definition of the term "accused" in § 16. The problems of free speech and due process men-
tioned later in this Comment are aggravated by the inclusion of accused persons in § 16.
See Comment, supra note 171, at 114.
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
176. Id. § 17.
177. Id. § 18. The five-year time limit specified in § 18 may be interpreted as establish-
ing not only an escrow period, but a new cause of action, because in most cases the statute of
limitations will have expired long before the five-year deadline. The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court took this position in Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 414
N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979). In Barrett a bank robber, whose profits from the movie "Dog Day
Afternoon" had been put into escrow by the New York Crime Victims Compensation
Board, was sued for assault and false imprisonment by one of his hostages. Although the
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The New York statute, upon which the Texas provision is based, has
been the focus of much controversy. 78 The constitutionality of the statute
has been questioned by the Library of Congress' legal research service, a
House Judiciary subcommittee staffer, and the New York Civil Liberties
Union, 179 but at this date, the New York statute still stands. The adoption
of the Texas provision may be attributed to the several victim compensa-
tion bills introduced into Congress during the last few years.' 80 At one
time a strong possibility existed that one of the prerequisites for federal
subsidization of state victim compensation programs would be a Son of
Sam act in the state.' 8' The 1979 bills, 82 however, are based generally on
a conference committee compromise of the 1977 bill,' 83 in which the con-
ference committee recognized that since the constitutionality of the Son of
Sam act was uncertain, a bill conditioning state subsidization on the adop-
tion of such a statute was undesirable. 184
At least two aspects of the provision present constitutional difficulties.
First, sections 16 through 18 contain no provisions for a hearing of any
kind. No procedure is provided to determine whether a criminal's efforts
come within the scope of the section, and the individual obligated to pay
the criminal must decide at his own risk whether to pay the Board in-
stead. 185 Because the Act may effectively deprive the criminal of his prop-
erty without a hearing, it is in potential contravention of the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 86 The second area of possi-
suit was brought long after the statute of limitations had run, the court refused to dismiss the
suit, holding that N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979) established a new
in rem cause of action with a five-year limitation. 414 N.Y.S.2d at 357. The New York
statute, however, states that money from the account will be paid provided that the "victim,
within five years of the date of the crime, brings a civil action" and recovers a judgment.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1979). The Texas statute does not link
the five-year limit with the victim's civil recovery, but treats each in a separate section. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 17-18 (Vernon Supp. 1980). This distinction may
prove crucial in the interpretation of the effect of the Texas Act on the statute of limitations.
178. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 171; Comment, Criminals-Turned-Authors Victims'
Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443 (1979).
179. Smith, Briefs, in JuRIs DOCTOR, Nov. 1977, at 6.
180. See generally note 18 supra.
181. See, e.g., H.R. 7010, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4(7) (1977).
182. See, e.g., H.R. 957, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For treatment of past and present
federal victim compensation legislation, see note 18 supra.
183. H.R. 7010, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
184. H.R. REP. No. 1762, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978).
185. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1980), places the bur-
den on the individual contracting with the criminal to decide if the contract falls within the
provisions of the statute.
186. The due process ramifications of prejudgment seizures are still unsettled; the
Supreme Court has alternatively expanded and contracted the process that is due a debtor
under state prejudgment garnishment or replevin statutes. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Although the Supreme Court has shifted its view of the
precise requirements of due process in such situations, most notably with regard to the tim-
ing of a hearing, the Court has uniformly held that a hearing is essential to due process when
property is seized before judgment. E.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 606 (1975). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1, §§ 16-18 (Vernon Supp.
1980) operates so that the escrow account can be established and dispersed without an op-
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ble difficulty involves the first amendment. Although Senator Gold, the
sponsor of the New York bill, was technically correct in stating that "[w]e
don't stop a prisoner from writing,"' 187 a statute authorizing the publisher
of a criminal's literary efforts to pay money owed the criminal into a five-
year escrow account is a clear disincentive for the criminal.188 To the ex-
tent that the criminal will refrain from seeking publication of his work, or
insofar as he attempts to confine his efforts to topics not prescribed by the
statute, the public will be deprived of the right to be informed. 189 For
example, a criminal's expressions of his thoughts at the time of the com-
mission of a capital crime could be valuable to the study of the deterrent
effect of capital punishment. 190 Thus, the statute appears to have a chilling
effect both on the criminal's right to free speech and on the public's right to
know.
The Texas version of New York's Son of Sam act is likely to cause more
problems than it will solve. 191 The provision is certain to encounter strong
constitutional challenges, and the litigation of the first and fourteenth
amendment issues may devour more state funds than the statute will make
available to victims. 192 Because there is no longer a serious threat that
federal subsidization will be contingent upon the existence of such a provi-
sion, sections 16 through 18 should be repealed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Texas Crime Victims Compensation Act creates a practical means
of recovery for the victims of violent crimes, supplementing the relatively
ineffectual alternatives of civil recovery, insurance, and restitution. The
legislature has taken strong action in attempting to alleviate the plight of
the victim, and this progressive legislation has the potential to bring about
substantial public benefits. By taking a hybrid approach, the drafters of
the Act had the opportunity to select the provisions that have proven most
desirable in the light of experience. For the most part, they were successful
in this selection process; of particular merit are the provisions for distribu-
portunity for a hearing of any kind. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see Com-
ment, supra note 171, at 99-105.
187. Smith, supra note 179, at 6.
188. See Comment, supra note 171, at 110-11.
189. The Supreme Court has indicated that it is "the heart of the natural right of mem-
bers of an organized society. . . to. . .acquire information about their common interests."
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936); see Comment, supra note 171, at
105-09.
190. Comment, supra note 171, at 109.
191. From a practical standpoint, the statute may even prove to be somewhat self-defeat-
ing. To the extent that criminals are discouraged from writing because of their inability to
collect profits, there will be less money available to satisfy the judgments held by victims.
Thus, the opportunities for victim recovery actually may be reduced by the statute, a result
that the legislature probably did not consider when it hurriedly enacted §§ 16-18. See Com-
ment, supra note 171, at 109.
192. The number of victims whose injuries result from a crime that attracts enough pub-
lic attention to merit a contract with the criminal is extremely small. Senator Gold, the
sponsor of the New York act, estimated that his act might affect one person every two years.
Smith, supra note 179, at 6.
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tion of applications and information, the lack of a minimum claim require-
ment, and a high maximum award. Several provisions were included,
however, despite widespread acknowledgment of their detrimental capac-
ity.
Perhaps the main weakness of the Act is the financial stress requirement.
The financial stress test imposes a substantial administrative burden on the
Board and involves an unwarranted invasion of the victim's financial pri-
vacy. The investigation of financial stress is neither fiscally justified nor
related to the primary goal of loss-spreading.
Another flaw in the Act is the household exclusion, because the exclu-
sion of victims living in the same household as the criminal responsible for
their injuries results in substantial injustices when applied to innocent chil-
dren. The arguments advanced to justify the household exclusion are evis-
cerated by the presence of provisions that prevent fraud and the
compensation of victims partially to blame for the crime. The unjust bene-
fit exclusion of the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act is an adequate
alternative to the household exclusion.
The Son of Sam provision raises constitutional problems that may con-
sume more funds through litigation expenses than the provision will make
available to crime victims. Although the provision serves the noble pur-
pose of preserving the criminal's crime-related profits for the victim's civil
recovery, the means adopted to serve this purpose may violate the first and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. While the lack of due process
may perhaps be remedied by the provision for a hearing, the Son of Sam
provision's chilling effect on speech cannot easily be alleviated.
Notwithstanding these imperfections, the Texas Crime Victims Com-
pensation Act is a laudable effort that ranks among the best of the state
victim compensation acts. If the program is sufficiently publicized and ad-
equately staffed, the Act promises to benefit substantially the criminally
injured. States that have not yet enacted victim compensation legislation
would be well advised to follow the progress of the Texas program and to
adopt the most successful provisions for their own acts.*
* Author's Note: At the time this Comment went to print, the Board was able to




Total amount awarded $32,094
Amount collected in Fund $151,000
Claims rejected 25
Grounds for Rejection:
Failure to cooperate with authorities 9
No financial stress 7
Behavior of victim 6
Participation in event 2
Residing in same household I
The only publicity efforts made by the Board at present are the statutorily required distribu-
tion of posters and forms to hospitals and physicians, and responses to media inquiries.
Telephone conversation with Bud Donnelly, examiner for Crime Victims Compensation Di-
vision of the Board, April 22, 1980.
[Vol. 34
